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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
A.K. & R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING * 
AND HEATING, * Priority No. 15 
* 
Plaintiff/Appellee, * No. 20001009 - CA 
vs. * 
THOMAS D. GUY and ASPEN * Trial Court Case: 
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah corporation, * No. 940300014CN 
* 
Defendants/Appellants. * 
THE ISSUE PRESENTED IN THIS APPEAL IS A QUESTION OF LAW. 
In footnote 1, page 2 of its brief Whipple claims that the Defendants have mis-
characterized the issue before this Court. Notwithstanding that Whipple failed to file any 
appeal or cross-appeal, Whipple states that the issue before the Court is: "Was it patent error 
or did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to grant either Whipple or the Defendants 
their attorney fees related to the 77 Thaynes Canyon property . . . ?" Whipple further 
suggests that the correct standard of review is one of patent error or clear abuse of discretion. 
Whipple, however, implicitly concedes in its brief (first at page 4 and again in paragraph 5, 
page 7) that the trial court was of the opinion that the outcome was essentially "a draw" and 
concluded that neither party should be awarded their fees. 
While this essentially concedes that the trial court applied the incorrect standard (i.e., 
"prevailing party" as opposed to the correct standard of "successful party") Whipple 
1 
nonetheless attempts to defend the trial court's actions by arguing to this Court that if one 
applies a "net advantage" analysis, it prevailedby $24,473.00. (See page 12 of Whipple's 
Brief.) This argument entirely ignores the well-established precedence on this issue. (See 
cases cited at page 7 of this brief below.) Paraphrasing this Court's recent decision in Kurth 
v. Wiarda, infra, the trial court should have applied the correct law and determined that 
because "Kurths (Guy and Aspen) successfully defended against the mechanics1 lien 
foreclosure action, brought by Wiarda (Whipple) . . . , they are statutorily entitled to 
attorney fees and costs against Wiarda (Whipple) under section 38-1-18." (Excerpt from 
page 1116) [Emphasis added by Appellants] 
Whipple further suggests that the correct focus of this appeal is not whether the trial 
court applied the correct law, but the reasonableness of the attorney fees award, i.e., none. 
Whipple maintains this position even though the trial court did not state that it was exercising 
any discretion to limit the attorney fees Guy and Aspen should be awarded or that the 
requested fees were unreasonable. In fact, based on Section 38-1-18, Appellants would 
respectfully submit that the trial court has little discretion other than determining the amount 
of reasonable attorney's fees since the statute is mandatory. See Reeves v. Steinfeldt 915 
P.2d 1073 (Utah App. 1996) where this Court held the language of this statute is mandatory, 
not discretionary, citing Richards v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 612 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
After reviewing the trial court's Memorandum Decision it was apparent to the 
Defendants that the trial court's underlying reason for denying any award of attorney fees to 
2 
Guy and Aspen (who had successfully defeated Whipple's lien claim) was the application 
of the incorrect legal standard, i.e. a prevailing party standard versus the successful party 
standard. This error seemed particularly poignant given the mandatory nature of Section 38-
1-18 U.C. A. and the abundance of case law regarding what constitutes a "successful party" 
as opposed to the several references in the trial court's Memorandum Decision to "prevailing 
party" and having just "barely prevailed." It is for this reason that the Defendants 
respectfully submit that the correct standard of review is a question of law. "Whether 
attorney's fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law, which this Court reviews for 
correctness." A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Construction, 977 P.2d 518, 
cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999).1 
In the prior appeal this Court stated the following in relationship to the HVAC issue 
and attorney fees: 
" . . . based upon our review of the record, it appears the HVAC claim was the 
single most important issue in the case and Aspen, having fully prevailed on 
the HVAC claim in this appeal, may now be entitled to prevailing party 
[Footnote 1] status under Section38-l-18." 
The text of footnote 1 reads: 
i 
Even if the standard of review was the "patent error or clear abuse of discretion" standard 
as postulated by Whipple, the Defendants respectfully suggest that having been successful 
in the first appeal on the issue of licensure, particularly in light of the express instructions of 
this Court remanding the issue to the trial court for a redetermination of attorney's fees 
consistent with its opinion, the failure to award any attorney's fees under such circumstances 
is "patent error" and is a "clear abuse of discretion." See Govert Copier Painting v. Van 
Leeuwen, infra, where this Court on remand instructed the trial court to award reasonable 
attorney fees, not merely nominal fees of $100.00. 
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"On remand, the trial court may find helpful the guidance on this issue offered 
by Mountain States Broad. Co. v. Neale. 783 P.2d 551, 555-58 (Utah Ct. 
App.1989)." 
As pointed out in footnote 8 in the prior brief, the reference by the Court of Appeals 
in the prior opinion to the Mountains States decision in all likelihood created more confusion 
than guidance. It is respectfully submitted that the reference to Mountain States was not only 
unnecessary, but invited error for the following reason: The issue of attorney fees in 
Mountain States was predicated on a contracts clause allowing recovery of attorney fees to 
the "prevailingparty," not the application of Section 38-1-18 U.C.A. which mandates the 
recovery of fees to the "successful party, " a totally different standard.2 Given this distinction 
alone it is difficult to see how Mountain States would be applicable. The application of the 
prevailing party standard articulated by the Court of Appeals in Mountain States, infra, 
(particularly the discussion in the portion of the opinion disposing of the Petition for 
Rehearing) allows the trial court considerable latitude in making various comparisons of the 
parties' claims and/or litigation positions and their relative success in relationship to those 
claims. The "successful party" standard is far more definite, i.e., either the lien claimant 
obtained an order of foreclosure or the opposing party was successful in defeating the lien 
claimant's claim. The relative success, in terms of how much a party prevailed by, is largely 
2 
The concept of "success" or "successful" indicates the attainment of an end purpose or 
goal such as foreclosing a lien or defeating a lien foreclosure claim. "Prevailing" on the 
other hand, by definition, requires reference to the parties' claims or litigation positions and 
can only be determined in relationship to such reference points. 
4 
if not totally, irrelevant. (See cases cited in next section of brief). In light of the clear 
authority defining what constitutes a "successful party," Mountain States could never be 
dispositive of the issue of attorney fees in this or any other lien foreclosure case. 
The use of the term "prevailing party" in the context of a mechanics5 lien claim is not 
unusual or even uncommon, however, except for the qualifying reference in the prior 
decision to Mountain States, such term was always understood to be synonymous with 
"successful." A review of the decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, as well as this Court, 
discloses that the authors of various decisions have utilized both terms when referring to the 
successful party. ProMax Development Corp. v. Raile, 998 P.2d 254 (Utah 2000) (Prevailing 
party language used in opinion, however, when attorney fees under §38-1-18 U.C.A. are 
discussed, "successful party" term is employed by the Court.); Kurth v. Wiarda. 991 P.2d 
1113,1116 (Utah App. 1999) (Both "prevailing party" and "successful party" terminology 
employed in discussion of §38-1-18 U.C.A. authorizing an award of attorney fees.); A.K. 
& R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Construction, 977 P.2d 518, 525 (Utah App. 
1999) (Prevailing party terminology used in conjunction with reference to §38-1-18 U.C.A 
requiring an award of atorney fees to the "successful party."); J.V. Hatch Constr.. Inc. v. 
Kampros. 971 P.2d 8, 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (Both "prevailing party" and "successful 
party" terminology employed by the Court.); American Rural Cellular. Inc. v. Systems 
Communication Corp.. 939 P.2d 185 (Utah App. 1997) (Both "prevailing party" and 
"successful party" terminology employed by the Court.); Reeves v. Steinfeldt 915 P.2d 1073 
(Utah App. 1996) (Homeowners referred to themselves as prevailing party for purposes of 
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attorney fees award under §38-1-18 U.C.A, Court cites statute and language requiring 
application of "successful party" standard.); American Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems 
Communication Corp., 890 P.2d 1035,1042(UtahApp. 1995) (Court uses "prevailing party" 
nomenclature in referring to §38-1 -18 U.C.A. authorizing recovery of attorney fees.); Govert 
Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1990) (Court uses "prevailing 
party" terminology in holding party entitled to attorney fees on mechanics' lien issue.) 
THOMAS GUY AND ASPEN ARE THE SUCCESSFUL PARTY, 
Throughout its brief Whipple makes multiple references to "prevailing party" and 
even makes the assertion that Whipple having prevailed on counterclaims with a net money 
recovery is a "successful party." This is a clear misstatement of the law. 
In Kurth v. Wiarda. 991 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Utah App. 1999) this Court stated at 
Paragraph 9 the following: 
TJ 9 A successful party includes one who successfully enforces or 
defends against a lien action. See Reeves v. Steinfeldt, 915 P.2d 1073, 1079 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996); Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 300-01, 
452 P.2d 325, 327-28 (1969). Here, the trial court concluded that the Kurths 
were the successful parties and entitled to an award of attorney fees under 
section 38-1-18 because the court dismissed the defendants' mechanics1 lien 
claim. Essentially, the court reasoned that in dismissing the mechanics1 lien 
action, the Kurths successfully defended against the mechanics1 lien. We 
agree. The only relevant claim for purposes of awarding attorney fees in this 
case was the mechanics1 lien claim which the Kurths successfully defended 
against; it is immaterial that defendants prevailed on the wrongful lien claim. 
See 1V. Hatch Constr., Inc. v. Kampros, 971 P.2d 8,15 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(" [A] lien claimant's prima facie evidence establishing its right to attorney fees 
is met by showing that it is the prevailing party in the mechanics* lien cause 
of action.") (emphasis added); see also Utah Code Ann. §38-9-2(3) 
(Supp.1999). 
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If 10 We also reject Wiarda's argument that the trial court erred in 
awarding attorney fees and costs against him individually. Because we hold 
that the Kurths successfully defended against the mechanics' lien foreclosure 
action, brought by Wiarda in his individual capacity, they are statutorily 
entitled to attorney fees and costs against Wiarda under section 38-1-18. 
{Excerpt from page 991 P. 2d 1116) 
A "successful party" is simply that; it is the party who successfully enforces or 
defends against a lien action. ProMax Development Corp. v. Raile, 998 P.2d 254 (Utah 
2000) (Homebuilder's lien foreclosure case was dismissed at early stages of litigation; 
appeal ensued. Utah Supreme Court determined that homeowners who successfully 
defended lien foreclosure action were entitled to attorney fees, including attorney fees 
incurred upon appeal); Kurth v. Wiarda, 991 P.2d 1113 (UtahApp. 1999) (Contractor was 
unsuccessful in lien foreclosure. Homeowners awarded attorney fees despite having their 
wrongful lien claim dismissed. Homeowners were deemed the successful party on basis of 
successfully defending against contractor's mechanics' lien claim. Attorney fees awarded 
to homeowners on lien claim and on other claims closely related to lien claim.); J.V. Hatch 
Const., Inc. v. Kampros. 971 P.2d 8 (Utah App. 1998) (Trial court granted contractor's lien 
foreclosure claim but denied his request for statutory attorney fees for failing to meet mailing 
requirement of lien statute. Utah Court of Appeals reversed trial court, clarified the mailing 
requirement and awarded attorney fees to contractor, including those spent on appeal.); 
Interlake Distributors. Inc. v. Old Mill Towne. 954 P.2d 1295 (Utah App. 1998) 
(Contractor's lien foreclosure was dismissed in summary judgment; appeal ensued. Lender 
and post-construction purchaser granted attorney fees, including attorney fees incurred in 
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appeal.); American Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Communication Corp., 939 P.2d 185 
(Utah App. 1997) (System builder was ultimately the successful party in counterclaim to 
foreclose lien against telephone licensee. System builder was entitled to attorney fees, 
including the attorney fees spent on appeal.); First General Services v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480 
(Utah App. 1996) (Subcontractor and contractor foreclosed on lien against homeowner. 
Subcontractor and contractor, as the successful parties, were awarded attorney fees under 
mechanics' lien statute.); Reeves v. Steinfeldt, 915 P.2d 1073 (Utah App. 1996) 
(Homeowners sued general contractor for wrongly filing mechanics' lien. Since contractor 
was unsuccessful in foreclosing lien, homeowners entitled to reasonable attorney fees.); 
Bailev-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1994) (Contractor filed 
complaint, including mechanics' lien foreclosure claim, against homeowners. Utah Court 
of Appeals awarded homeowners attorney fees as successful party under mechanics' lien 
statute, remanding the case back to the trial court for determination of the amount of attorney 
fees.); Richards v. Security Pacific Nat. Bank, 849 P.2d 606 (Utah App. 1993) (After 
property owner refinanced, holder of mechanics' lien brought suit to adjudicate the priority 
of his claim as superior to those claims of new mortgage holder. Mechanics' lien claimant 
awarded attorney fees as successful party in enforcement of his lien.); Govert Copier 
Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1990) (Painting contractor filed 
untimely mechanics' lien against hiring contractor and property owner. Hiring contractor, 
as successful party, was awarded only "nominal" attorney fees of one hundred dollars by trial 
court. Utah Court of Appeals remanded case back to trial court with instructions to award 
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"a reasonable attorney fee" to hiring contractor, including those incurred upon appeal.); 
Nu-Trend Elec, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n, Inc., 786 P.2d 1369 (Utah App. 
1990) (Subcontractors were unsuccessful in lien foreclosure. Utah Court of Appeals awarded 
trust deed holder attorney fees in successfully defending against subcontractor's attempts to 
foreclose lien claims, including those attorney fees incurred upon appeal.); Bailey v. Call 
767 P.2d 138 (Utah App. 1989) (Trial court ruled that supplier could not foreclose on lien. 
Supplier appealed and Utah Court of Appeals ruled that supplier's lien was valid, lien 
foreclosure was enforced, and supplier was awarded attorney fees.); Rottav.Hawk. 756 P.2d 
713 (Utah App. 1988) (Contractor was unsuccessful in lien foreclosure action; lender was 
not awarded attorney fees by trial court. Lender appealed. On appeal, the lender, as the 
successful party in defending the enforcement of the lien, was awarded attorney fees by the 
Utah Court of Appeals.); AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Development and Energy Co., 714 
P.2d 289 (Utah 1986) (Trial court ruled in favor of labor and materials provider in lien 
foreclosure action. Purchaser of property appealed, and lien claimant's judgment of 
foreclosure was set aside in ruling by the Utah Supreme Court. Whereas lien claimant was 
originally awarded attorney fees by trial court, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that property 
purchaser was now entitled to attorney fees as the successful party.); Duckett v. Olsen. 699 
P.2d 734 (Utah 1985) (Contractors successfully foreclosed on lien. Trial court awarded 
attorney fees to contractors as the successful party; bank appealed ruling. Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed trial court.); Duggerv.Cox. 564 P.2d 300 (Utah 1977) (Party who improved 
property as per contract, but was not compensated, successfully foreclosed on lien. Utah 
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Supreme Court affirmed trial court upon appeal and awarded attorney fees to party who 
improved the property, the successful party.); Brimwood Homes. Inc. v. Knudsen Builders 
Supply Co., 385 P.2d 982 (Utah 1963) (Materialman filed lien to protect his interest in 
compensation from builder. Builder responded with suit to void materialman's claim to lien, 
tendering "receipt and lien release" as evidence of the invalidity of materialman's lien. Utah 
Supreme Court validated materialman's lien and awarded him attorney fees as the successful 
party in the action.); and Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1279, 
1287 (Utah 1982) (Attorney fees award of $34,000.00 against lien claimants who were 
unsuccessful in obtaining lien foreclosure sustained on appeal.) 
As stated in the prior brief, the concept of a successful party (as opposed to a 
prevailing party standard) is one that is mutually exclusive. One is a successful party by 
either enforcing a mechanics' lien (if you are the mechanics' lien claimant), or preventing 
a mechanics' lien from being enforced (if you are the party against whom the mechanics' lien 
claim is being brought.) While it may be possible that a party could be a prevailing party and 
not be a successful party, it is highly improbable.3 
References by Whipple in its brief to the "prevailing party standard" (see particularly 
page 13 of Whipple's brief) unnecessarily confuses the issue. Whipple makes no effort to 
refute or attempt any analysis of the case law cited by Guy and Aspen as to what constitutes 
3 
In this case, the negligent workmanship claim for the HVAC system is directly related to 
the work for which Whipple claimed a lien under the mechanics' lien statute. And, in 
accordance with the Kurth decision, Guy and Aspen are entitled to attorney fees for matters 
related or inter-twined with the mechanics' lien claim. 
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a successful party. See page 12 of Appeallants' Brief citing Petty Inv. Co. v. Miller, 576 
P.2d 883 (Utah 1978); Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297,452 P.2d 325 (1969); and 
Rotta v. Hawk, 756 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1988). Whipple simply ignores the case law and 
attempts to argue a rationalization that is premised upon the incorrect legal standard, i.e., a 
prevailing party standard. 
GIVEN THE MANDATORY NATURE OF §38-1-18 U.C.A., THE TRIAL 
COURT'S AWARD OF NO ATTORNEY FEES IS NOT REASONABLE, 
The Court of Appeals was faced with almost this exact issue in Govert Copier 
Painting v. Van Leeuwen, supra. In remanding the case back to the trial court, this Court 
stated the following: 
"We have consistently encouraged trial courts to make findings to explain the 
factors which they considered relevant in arriving at an attorney fee award." 
Regional Sales, 784 P.2d at 1215. See also Cabrera, 694 P.2d at 624. We 
have held that unless the court offers an explanation for the reduction of the 
attorney fees requested in a case where there is adequate and uncontroverted 
evidence in the record to support the fees, it abuses its discretion. See 
Regional Sales, 784 P.2d at 1216; Martindale v. Adams, 111 P.2d 514, 518 
(Utah Ct.App.1989). See also Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 987-91. 
In this case, the trial court reduced the award from the $1,387.50 
requested to $100.00 and stated: 
what the court is going to do is grant nominal attorney fees of $100.00 
on that. I think it is based on the merits of this case and the fact that 
defendant has received considerable amount of services for practically 
nothing, I guess, except attorney[f]s fees. 
[18] [19] The trial court, while it explained its reason for reducing the 
attorney fee award, (FN 13) did not utilize the factors established by appellate 
courts as relevant to a reduction in fees. We therefore reverse and remand for 
the determination of reasonable attorney fees to be awarded to Van Leeuwen 
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as the prevailing party on the mechanics1 lien issue. In addition, Van Leeuwen 
is entitled to his attorney fees on appeal insofar as attributable to the 
mechanics' lien issue. See Nu-TrendElec, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Assoc, 786 P.2d 1369,1372 (Utah Ct.App.1990). See also Mountain States 
Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 776 P.2d 643 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). Thus, the trial 
court should also determine reasonable attorney fees for services rendered at 
the trial level and on appeal on the mechanics' lien issue. (FN 14) (Excerpt 
from page 174) 
The issue raised in Point 3 of Whipple's brief is a nonissue. The Defendants agree 
completely with the law cited by Whipple at pages 13 and 14 of its brief to the effect that 
attorney fees must be reasonable and must be based upon the factors discussed in the cases 
cited by Whipple. However, as in Govert Copier, the trial court's analysis and consideration 
of the factors in this case is insufficient as a matter of law. (The trial court's Memorandum 
Decision is set forth as Addendum 4 Jo the initial brief.) The only explanation for the trial 
court reaching the result it arrived at is that the trial court did not want to award any attorney 
fees to Aspen and Thomas Guy because the trial court was applying a prevailing party 
standard, rather than focusing on which party was successful in the prosecution of the lien 
claim or defending against the mechanics' lien, which is what the statute and case law 
requires. 
It is apparent that the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard. In order for this 
Court to fulfill its appellate functions of insuring legal accuracy and uniformity of the laws 
of the state, it must reverse the trial court and remand with clear instructions that in light of 
the trial court's application of the law regarding the lack of HVAC licensure (as declared in 
the prior appeal) that Whipple is not the successful party, since an order of foreclosure with 
12 
respect to the lien claim was not ordered by the trial court, and as a consequence, the 
Defendants, Guy and Aspen, are the successful party in relationship to the mechanics' lien 
involved on the 77 Thayne's Canyon property.4 
NO CROSS APPEAL WAS FILED BY WHIPPLE, 
At page one of its brief, Whipple indicates that the issue presented for appeal in this 
case is: "Was it patent error, or did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to grant 
either Whipple or the Defendant their attorney fees related to 77 Thayne's Canyon property 
. . . ?" To the extent Whipple asserts it can obtain an award of attorney fees, this is a 
complete and total misstatement of the issue before this Court. It is undisputed that there has 
been no appeal or cross appeal filed by Whipple in this case. See paragraph 6, page 8 
Whipple Brief (Record 2050). Cross-appeals are properly limited to grievances a party has 
with the judgment as it was entered-not grievances it might acquire depending on the 
outcome of the appeal. See Cunningham v. Lynch-Davidson Motors, Inc.. 425 So.2d 131, 
133 (Fla.App.1982) (Cross-appeal only required when respondent seeks to vary or modify 
judgment below); See also Halladav v. Cluff. 739 P.2d 643 (Utah App. 1987) citing Terry 
v. Zions Co-Op. Mercantile Inst.. 617 P.2d 700,701 (Utah 1980) ("[I]f a respondent desires 
4 
The Court of Appeals should not lose sight of the fact that no appeal or cross appeal has 
been taken by either party from the trial court's determination that Whipple was the 
successful party as to the Diane Quinn and the Tom Guy pool house lien foreclosure actions 
for which Whipple was awarded reasonable attorney fees related to those actions. Those 
matters, cases 94-00012 and 94-00013, are now res judicata. 
13 
to attack the judgment and change it in his favor, he must timely file a cross-appeal....") 
See also 15 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3904 (1976). 
Consequently, this appeal is limited solely to whether or not Aspen and Guy are 
entitled to their reasonable attorney fees. Since Whipple failed to file a cross appeal and 
preserve this issue, the only issue before this Court is the issue raised by Thomas Guy and 
Aspen. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court recognized in the prior appeal that based upon the record before it, the 
HVAC claim was the single most important issue in the case and Guy and Aspen, having 
fully prevailed on the HVAC claim in the first appeal, would likely be entitled to successful 
party status under Section 38-1-18. The reason the Court of Appeals remanded the case back 
to the trial court was for a factual determination as to how the denial of the HVAC claim 
recovery played out in the totality of the circumstances with the various other claims 
involved with the 77 Thayne's Canyon Property. The trial court analyzed those various 
claims which resulted in a net recovery of $527.00 to the Defendant. In actuality the 
monetary recovery is immaterial. The issue is whether or not Whipple succeeded in 
enforcing its mechanics' lien claim to any extent. The answer to this question is in the 
negative, and Whipple, consequently, cannot be the successful party. Conversely, Aspen and 
Thomas Guy are the successful parties in relationship to the 77 Thayne's Canyon property 
lien since they successfully defended against the lien foreclosure action brought by Whipple. 
14 
Given this result, it was error for the trial court to refuse to award Aspen and Guy their 
reasonable attorney fees in defending the lien action (including those fees incurred on appeal) 
and such error was due to the application of the incorrect legal standard. 
In this instance, the trial court applied the incorrect law. However, it was also 
apparent that under no circumstances was the trial court willing to award any attorney fees 
to the Defendants Guy and Aspen. Because the trial court went to great lengths to explain 
why it could deny Guy and Aspen (the successful parties as to the lien foreclosure action 
involving the 77 Thayne's Canyon property) their reasonable attorney fees, the Defendants 
respectfully request that the matter be remanded to a different trial judge to assure that they 
can receive a fair ruling as to the proper amount of reasonable attorney fees, including those 
attorney fees incurred in both the first and second appeals. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J_£_ day of A u g u s U O Q L ^ ^ ^ 
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